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TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL POLICY OPTIONS
FOR DEVELOPMENT FORESTRY
GEORGE M. GUESS*

INTRODUCTION
Within the last five years, lending institutions and less developed

country (LDCY host governments have recognized the critical importance of forestry to rural development. Prior to that time, and still
held as a minority view, experts advocated large scale industrial development of forest resources. For the most part, this strategy ignored

the economic and ecological benefits of forestry to the developing
society. Today, the debate now focuses primarily on means of integrating forestry benefits into rural development strategies. The issue
is no longer whether forestry can contribute, but how it may contribute.
This question may be subdivided further: (1) What technical options exist for forestry integration into rural development? and (2)
What financial policy options would be optimal for stimulating and
guiding forestry for development? The first question relates to issues
of administrative structure and scale, timber species, soil and climatic
conditions, and managerial design and budgeting of an appropriate
technical assistance package. The second relates to models of financial
forestry for development in varying sociopolitical contexts. Although
both sets of policy options are conceptually similar, the technical options are more closely tied to line level administrative decisions, while
the financial options indicate strategies designed at staff policy levels.
*Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Political Science, University of New
Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico. The author is currently on leave in Washington, D.C.,
working on forestry projects for the United States Agency for International Development,
Office of Rural Development and Development Administration.
1. Todaro cites six characteristics of developing or less developed countries: (1) low
levels of living; (2) low rates of productivity; (3) high rates of population growth; (4) high
and rising levels of unemployment and underemployment; (5) significant dependence on
agricultural production and primary product exports; and (6) dominance, dependence and
vulnerability in international relations. M. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE
THIRD WORLD 24 (1977). Todaro also suggests that whether or not most of these countries are actually developing is a moot point. As he states, "It all depends on one's definition
of development. However, for expository convenience and in order to avoid semantic confusion, we will use the adjectives 'developing,' 'less developed,' and 'underdeveloped' interchangeably throughout the text when referring to Third World countries as a whole. To do
otherwise would unnecessarily complicate the discussion." Id. at 37. The abbreviation LDC
will serve the same purposes for this article.
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This article presents a critical overview of technical and financial policy options which encourage development forestry and argues for
public influence in enterprise ownership or control as an appropriate
means to that end.
TRADITIONAL VERSUS DEVELOPMENT FORESTRY
Forestry's potential benefits may be categorized as ecological and
economic. Historical emphasis on short term exploitation of forest
resources by private companies intensified the need to expand production for development and to protect the ecology of forests. Inappropriate forests practices, for example, eliminated timber in watersheds and encouraged flooding, soil erosion, and waterway siltage.
Protracted deforestation, now estimated at 6000 square miles per
year,2 creates ecological nightmares that translate into the desertification phenomenon on a worldwide scale. The negative ecological
impact of deforestation has been noted repeatedly in the literature. 3
Since deforestation undermines the soil and water bases of agriculture, ecological consequences intimately affect economic activities.
The traditional view of forestry focuses on large scale production
(pulp and paper or furniture) supplied by corporate treefarms and
processed by secondary manufacturing plants. Although LDCs such
as Chile and Brazil can afford to sustain this approach, it is now
widely recognized that forestry represents a valuable opportunity for
serving broader rural development objectives. While the traditional
view stresses investor interests, development forestry considers environmental and socioeconomic issues. For example, Gregersen found
primary corporate motives for foreign investment in Latin American
forestry to be obtaining raw materials or semifinished products for
the parent company, securing a reserve of raw materials for the
future, and increasing profits either directly or indirectly through
U.S. tax advantages.4 The traditional view defines development as
2. Spears & Yudelman, Forests in Development, 16 FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
42 (December 1979).
3. See, e.g., E. ECKHOLM, LOSING GROUND: ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS AND
WORLD FOOD PROSPECTS (1976); G. Guess, The Politics of Agricultural Land Use and
Development Contradictions: The Case of Forestry in Costa Rica (September 1, 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in University of California, Riverside Library); Guess, Bureaucracy
and the Unmanaged Forest Commons in Costa Rica (Or Why Development Does Not Grow
on Trees) (December 1979) (working paper prepared for the University of New Mexico
Latin American Institute, Albuquerque, New Mexico); Guess, PastureExpansion, Forestry,
and Development Contradictions: The Case of Costa Rica, 14 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 42, 54 (Spring 1979); Parsons, Forest to Pasture:Development or Destruction, 24 REVISTA DE BIOLOGIA TROPICAL 120, 131 (June 1976).
4. H. GREGERSEN & A. CONTRERAS, U.S. INVESTMENT IN THE FOREST-BASED
SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA 31 (1975).

January 19811

TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL POLICY

expansion of human choice through increases in productivity and
access to employment and distributional benefits. It assumes the
trickle downward and outward effect of neoclassical economics.
Capitalist investment in efficient forestry projects that recover costs
for investors alone is supposed to expand markets, create effective
linkage to the rest of the economy, and provide development benefits.
It should be noted that the traditional view is not reinforced so
much by a project evaluation methodology that tends to exclude
social accounting as by the tendency of Third World governments to
consider forests as obstacles to development. As stated by Worrall,
"Forestry department operations in these countries have been overshadowed by other more powerful government bureaucracies." ' The
critical bias then is in policy decisions based on political criteria of
short run cost recovery projects or in LDCs encouragement of foreign investors to exploit forests with only marginal development
benefit.
Development ForestryBenefits
The development forestry perspective notes persistent market failure and an imposition of political preferences by the local "kleptocratic autocracy ' 6 that perpetuates underdevelopment. Development
forestry suggests individual or cooperative use of tree crops to improve income and employment opportunities of the rural poor. This
viewpoint attempts to include hard to measure benefits of forestry
programs which accrue only indirectly to those who grow trees, such
as equity, effects of saved time, and ecological benefits.' As Wolfson
notes, "In the selection of development projects, benefits should be
disaggregated to identify the relative shares of the rich and the poor,
and emphasis should be put on the employment-creating effects, both
direct and indirect in terms of inputs from local industry." 8 Forest
project benefits can be broadened to serve development objectives if
public expenditures, fiscal policy, and capital budgeting analysis are
redirected. For example, longer cost recovery periods implied in
schemes to benefit small treefarmers, can be viewed as societal savings
on a worthy capital investment.
5. Worrall, Scientists Say Jungles Mismanaged, Underutilized, Christian Science Monitor,
March 14, 1980, § 1, at 10, col. 3.
6. D. WOLFSON, PUBLIC FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (1979). According to Wolfson, "Individual preferences are observed to be disregarded, not just marginally-by self-promoting bureaucrats-but integrally, when the existing power structure permits a 'kleptocratic' autocracy to do as it pleases." Id. at 16. Developing country political
systems provide even fewer checks and balances against autocratic behavior than the socalled "mature democracies."
7. The World Bank, Forestry Sector Policy Paper 6 (February 1978).
8. WOLFSON, supra note 6, at 75.
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Development forestry also supports improving ecological balance
by reforestation of cut-over areas, and afforestation of previously unforested areas to enhance productive capability of the land. The
smaller and medium-sized farmer and landless worker can benefit directly from forestry products as cash crops: fuelwood, pulpwood,
sawtimber, wood chips, or charcoal. Economic benefits can be realized through off-farm employment opportunities in mills, factories,
woodlots, or on self-run farms. Income distribution can be improved
by generating wealth that is transmitted to society at large, as purchasing power and foreign exchange. Likewise, land productivity can
improve by intercropping and more advanced range management
techniques where timber is grown exclusively for ecological reasons.
These economic benefits of development forestry are well recognized
in the literature and are the basis for numerous recent forestry development projects.9 Historically, however, most resources have been
committed to traditional, industrially oriented forest management
projects, instead of agroforestry schemes designed for development
contribution.
The options provided in this paper are intended to expand the role
of forestry in the total rural development strategy. They assume that
the major objective of rural development in Third World nations is
"the progressive improvement in rural levels of living achieved primarily through increases in small farm incomes, output, and productivity." 1 Forestry can contribute to small and medium farmers and
rural landless workers by providing needed consumer products, increasing employment, and generating foreign exchange.' I Unprocessed wood used for fuel or fertilizer, or processed for building
materials, poles, railway ties, or paper can provide numerous end
products for domestic consumption. Beyond this, however, timber
growth and processing create jobs, new skills, upward mobility, confidence in economic participation, and benefits in national growth
9. See Gregersen, Development Possibilitiesin Forestry: Costa Rica (1975) (report prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.); E. ECKHOLM, supra
note 3; G. Guess, The Politics of Agricultural Land Use and Development Contradictions:
The Case of Forestry in Costa Rica (September 1, 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in University of California, Riverside Library). See also The World Bank, Appraisal of the Second
Forestry Plantation Project Kenya, Report No. 706-KE (1975); The World Bank, Philippines:
Appraisal of the Smallholder Treefarming and Forestry Project, Report No. 169a-PH (1977);
International Science and Technology Institute, Watershed Reforestation and Fuelwood Development Design for Sri Lanka, AID/ASIA-C-1400 (1979); United States Agency for International Development, Costa Rica: National Resources Conservation, Project Paper No. 5150145 (1979); United States Agency for International Development, Panama: Watershed
Management, Project Paper No. 525-0191 (1979).
10. M. TODARO, supra note 1, at 225.
11. The World Bank, Forestry Sector Policy Paper 15 (February 1978).
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through product exports. Approximately 200 million potential beneficiaries live within or on the margin of forests. "Tree farming combined with agriculture could significantly improve their quality of
life and per capita incomes. "12
It is largely a traditional view that the costs of forestry from a development perspective outweigh its potential benefits. Development
forestry consists of cultivation and harvest of tree crops on a sustained yield basis by smaller and medium sized farm owners, in large
scale cooperatives or individual smaller plots, to improve income employment opportunities. This is often inconsistent with traditional
forestry which usually requires early cost recovery and profit maximization. By contrast, Costa Rica is combining the programs of its
land reform agency with treefarming and sawmilling to enhance the
quality of rural life. This approach recognizes that the Sistema Forestal Social' I requires public sector capital investment to produce benefits that will accrue after several decades according to narrow cost
recovery criteria. From the development forestry perspective, benefits accrue in the short term.
TraditionalForestry Problems
Today, data and experience gathered from actual development forestry projects largely discredit the traditional view. Following an
overview of traditional arguments which have buttressed opposition
to development forestry, this article will examine technical and fiscal
policy approaches which facilitate successful development ventures.
First, traditional proponents argue that large scale forestry permits
economies of scale for production to stimulate both supply and
demand for forest products. High transaction or administrative costs
associated with untrained landless workers and smaller farmers, when
combined with technical problems of species selection, thinning,
rotating, and harvesting (plus risk of crop loss by fire or disease)
render the development use of forestry prohibitive and uneconomic.
But experiences with small scale cooperative forestry in Honduras' '
and in the Philippines indicate contrary results. According to Spears
and Yudelman, the smallholder tree farming project in the Philippines
provided a return to farmers in 1977 of 25% "which compares favor12. Id. at 6.
13. OFICINA DE PLANIFICACION NACIONAL Y POLITICA ECONOMICA (OFIPLAN), PLAN NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO FORESTAL: 1979-1982 at 131 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as OFIPLAN]. The term "sistema forestal social," like "development forestry," refers to the relationship between forestry production and the wider socioeconomic
benefits which can be created by appropriate public policies.
14. Cortes, Sistema Social Forestal en Honduras (1976) (report prepared for Corporacion
Hondurena de Desarrollo Forestal (COHDEFOR) in Honduras).
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ably to the average rate of return of 9% for North American forest
product companies." ' I
Second, traditionalists suggest that while deforestation occurs,
much of its negative impact is controlled by natural regrowth. Some
link deforestation to animals, small slash and burn cultivators, or
natural forest fires. While such causes appear on record, more worldwide examples of deforestation exist at the hands of large farmers
and timber companies, who often employ colonos or "spontaneous"
colonizers as cheap labor to enhance their profits. These actors do
not employ sustained yield practices or reforestation to compensate
for timber losses in LDCs. Eckholm notes siltage in Colombia, for
instance, and Spears-Yudelman describe the Indian and Bangladesh
1
flooding caused by deforestation in the Nepal catchment area. 6
Natural regrowth of hardwood trees, in contrast to other tropical
vegetation, is a lengthy process; the negative effects on soil and water
supplies from deforestation are almost immediate and may well prevent natural regrowth.
Finally, some have argued that forestry provides a comparative advantage only for selected countries. Widespread international production may drive the market price down and make increased poverty
the ironic consequence of vast expenditures on forestry. This is especially true in Chile where the government now generally leaves resource allocation decisions to the free market.' ' Basing its forest sector development strategy largely on the monocultural growth of pine
for narrow industrial market benefits, Chile increasingly faces wood
product export competition from Brazil. With respect to the growing
Asian market, Chile also faces location disadvantages in relation to
New Zealand and Australia. Export expansion will be constrained for
the next five to ten years by availability of wood, expected growth
of domestic demand, a need for sawmill modernization, and capacity
limitations of pulp and paper production. 1 8 For these reasons Chile
may be caught in a comparative advantage squeeze, unless public policies support a broader development forestry approach. While the
comparative advantage argument is partly true, it tends to ignore the
elastic quality of cost and price definitions. "Traditional measures of
benefit and cost have emphasized efficiency and growth objectives
and neglected the distribution of income and the stability with which
it is forthcoming." 1 9 As noted earlier, resource costs of deforestation
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Spears & Yudelman, supra note 2, at 42.
E. ECKHOLM, supra note 3, at 150; Spears & Yudelman, supra note 2, at 43.
THE WORLD BANK, CHILE: AN ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 195 (1980).
Id. at 200.
D. WOLFSON, supra note 6, at 109.
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extend to agriculture and may diminish the productivity of other related land uses. The market price of forest products is a function of
commodity scarcity which creates value. Since many products are
imported, causing negative balance of payments and inflationary
pressures, forest products can substitute for imports and create a
nascent local demand for previously unavailable products. As indicated by the growing number of LDC forestry programs and projects,
the critical nature of the forest sector to LDC economies has been
belatedly acknowledged by development practitioners. The ironic
spectre of poor countries eliminating development opportunties, such
as forestry, has finally shifted academic emphasis from whether to
how development forestry projects can be designed and implemented.
Technical Options
This section will discuss technical issues of timber inventories and
investment, institutional and administrative structures, and high
farmer opportunity costs. While many of the technical problems of
development forestry have been resolved, subproblems of institutional design, budgeting, and financial management have not. The
problems of an integrated technical-financial strategy for development forestry include differences in technical judgment among professionals, lack of administrative capability, and defects in technical
design and budget processes.
Technical problems have related largely to tropical subculture and
the transfer of forestry techniques to LDC environments. Many of
the technical problems, of course, are caused by lack of research on
species yields or site capabilities, lack of accurate forest inventories
to aid future utilization, and the absence of land use and soil surveys
as a prerequisite for balanced agricultural settlement in tropical regions. For example, Gregersen notes that in the case of Latin American native forests there is "generally little knowledge of wood properties and a lack of experience with utilization requirements." Given
expected "increasing technical knowledge with respect to wood
properties," he suggests that exploited native forests will continue to
be the main source of forest products but will be supplemented by
man-made forests of either native or introduced species. o
Much of the technical debate seems to be ideological and professional. For example, forestry existed on paper and behind desks in
Costa Rica until 1975. Previously, forest planners designed projects,
and calculated annual costs and yields under varying conditions with
data and information derived from other tropical countries. Others
20. H. GREGERSEN & A. CONTRERAS, supra note 4, at 13.
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debated the need for native versus introduced species for large scale
reforestation. With the exception of a small pilot project in Turrialba,
Costa Rica, little was actually invested in forestry. Nothing was done
to stimulate development of forestry. In 1979, however, spurred by
local professional support and environmental groups, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) began implementing development forestry production projects in both Costa Rica
and Panama. 2 1
Institutionaland Administrative Problems
Eckholm documents the tendency of professionals such as foresters, engineers, and economists to fragment expertise and jealously
ignore each other's contribution into agricultural development. 2 2
Such technical problems point toward needed managerial and policy
coordination efforts in the short run.
An important analytical challenge is to devise feasible policy options by which LDC decision makers can transform traditional forestry practices into development forestry programs. This translates
into the practical task of designing an administrative strategy. Despite
the growing spate of literature on redesign of technical assistance
packages, retooling organizations for developmental tasks, and encouraging soft path energy/natural resource development by LDCs,
the institutional variable has been ignored in all but the most traditional sense. Institution-building is still viewed as a matter of technical training. Trained experts will then shatter the constraints posed
by the political structure and make rational choices to implement development forestry programs. As of 1980, this movement simply has
not happened and institutions continue to be viewed by funding
agencies in simplistic terms. Specifically, options must be selected by
international lending organizations and their host governments that
(1) enhance organizational capability to encourage present and potential farmers/entrepreneurs to engage in primary-secondary forestry
practices for development, and (2) design and utilize finance options
appropriate to the LDC institutional and agricultural context.
Traditional institution-building efforts have focused on transfer of
scientific management, personnel, budgeting, and information systems from developed countries to private and public LDC organiza21. Guess, Policy Analysis and Natural Resource Conservation in Costa Rica (January
16, 1980) (report prepared for the United States Agency for International Development,
Washington, D.C.); Guess, Crosswalking RENARE-AID Budget Categories for Performance
Evaluation: The Panama Watershed Project (January 17, 1980) (report prepared for the
United States Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.).
22. E. ECKHOLM, supra note 3, at 22.
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tions. This "tool orientation" tends to ignore local features that can
constrain organizational activities in paradoxical ways. It also ignores
the novel nature of the task of integrating forestry into rural development strategies. In particular, the institutional system must manage
the technical activities of tree farming, processing, and manufacturing efficiently, while assuring distributional benefits in income and
employment. For example, the debate over the use of centralized
versus decentralized organizational means to improve performance
has not clarified guidelines for LDC decisionmakers in development
forestry. Perhaps, the optimal organization is staff-centralized and
line-decentralized, unless the nature of the task is capital or labor intensive. Nor has the injection of scientific management and modem
objective personnel practices enhanced organizational incentives to
formulate such innovative programs as development forestry. Yet the
importance of public administrative techniques and structures may
be greater to the success of development forestry than improved
project evaluation. Nelson notes that
While it is evident that there is plenty of scope to improve the
reality or quality of evaluation for new-land development projects,
the argument that the really significant advances are to be made in
the area of administration carries considerable weight ... more
effort should be directed to the efficient execution of whatever is
undertaken. 2 3
When the LDC commits resources to forestry, they tend to be absorbed by over centralized public ministries or decentralized autonomous agencies that negotiate concessions and royalty agreements directly with private companies. When the LDC practices desk forestry,
the relevant agency usually lacks budget authority and often occupies
a back office of the ministry of agriculture. Nelson tends to ignore
budgeting and financial management questions except in the execution phase of the budget process. He argues instead for coordination
of forestry projects through existing autonomous agencies responsible
for public capital projects such as irrigation, energy, and highways.2 I
Unfortunately, this view hides the tendency of such agencies to maintain "efficiency" reputations through approval of profitable projects
with narrow benefits over development forestry projects whose benefits tend to be wider, less quantifiable, and long term. Further, such
agencies often treat costs as opportunity costs of an investment diverted to the public from the private sector. Thus, calculations toward
23. M. NELSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF TROPICAL LANDS: POLICY ISSUES IN
LATIN AMERICA 256 (1973).

24. Id. at 258.
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early returns and profit maximization in the traditional sense are
biased. In addition, the novel nature of the development forestry task
requires flexibility to negotiate agreements, secure marketing and distribution contracts, and diffuse technical assistance or extension,
while having peremptory authority to acquire public and sometimes
private lands by condemnation for forestry uses. Development forestry also requires an agency with authority to fix minimum market
prices, provide credit, and disburse multiple kinds of farmer subsidies.
Where any of these features are lacking in a LDC forestry scheme, or
where multiple agencies compete for their provision, implementation
is less likely to be efficient and effective.
Budgeting Alternatives
It is therefore essential that technical policy options be pursued
which (1) rationalize budgeting for forestry, and (2) secure multi-year
authorizations of budget authority. Budgeting is the core of public
organizational activity from which actions can be predicted accurately
or glossed over in a process irrelevant to decisionmaking. Therefore
enhanced decisionmaking quality for development forestry depends
on reform of the budgeting process. Most LDC budgeting systems
distribute resources from a highly distorted competitive system that
consistently rewards elites and dominant classes while hiding the fact
from auditors and other infomation seekers. The line item budget
and its underlying network of administrative support tends to perpetuate a worldwide system of marginal accountability that permits
sporadic analysis and politically motivated investigation. Distorted
budget processes and poorly conceived information systems have inhibited LDC development forestry efforts. Again, note that administration of the budget or financial management is considered here to
be a technical matter while redesign of the budget process to produce
information and accommodate regulation and subsidy policies is considered to be a financial option.
Typical forest ministry budgets often detail gross expenditures in
broad line items and reveal little more than revenue and expenditure
balances for personnel and equipment. Finance ministries interested
in control over expenditures in a narrow sense often compete against
planning ministries that project, for instance, cubic meters of timber
growth costs, and development benefits without integrating standard
national budgeting practices into their calculations.2 5 The common
25. The perennial conflict between LDC planning and budgeting actors is detailed in N.
CAIDEN & A. WILDAVSKY, PLANNING AND BUDGETING IN POOR COUNTRIES 23963 (1974).
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result is desk forestry where a ministry of finance controls the budget
process. In the rarer instance where planning dominates the budget
process, the typical result is over emphasis of traditional forestry investments to the exclusion of development benefits. A performanceoriented budgetary system which would permit financial management
for development forestry is urgently needed. Lending agencies should
encourage information producing measures and a system of budget
requests that stress alternative results for differing levels of effort.
Often termed zero-based review, 2 6 this system can be installed without radical organizational change, can encourage the self-analysis required for cost identification, and fix responsibility centers to implement development forestry.
The second option which must be pursued is establishing multiyear budget authority. Common for capital projects with lifetimes
longer than one budget year, such authority facilitates forestry program planning with realistic budgetary figures; obligations paced over
the budget year then can be audited on a yearly basis. This authority
is common in LDC agencies responsible for dam and irrigation projects. Nelson's hypothesis is that such agencies have the "most prestige
and therefore the financial position to follow through on long-term
projects and to attract capable administrators."'2 7 Whether an LDC
planning development forestry should run the program through a new
agency, or change the budget authority of an existing one depends
on the political environment. These options pertain strictly to the
management of forestry from the public perspective. A related question is the capability of public organizations to deal with private
parties and select appropriate finance options where a mixed privatepublic strategy may be required. Improved budgetary analysis and installation of better information systems will enhance such capability,
conditional, of course, on the local political will to implement development programs.
Balancing Opportunity Costs
Inertia from traditional agriculture activities may impede political
support for a development forestry program. Large agroexport farmers
may seek higher, short term profits from the usually favorable international prices of selected commodities such as beef cattle and coffee.
Smaller farmers may persist in growing domestic market-oriented
crops because extensive services and land are unavailable. These
26. J. BEYER, BUDGET INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE EXPERIENCE IN NEPAL 126 (1973).
27. M. NELSON, supra note 23, at 258.
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farmers also fear the risk of a failed new crop. In both cases, the op2
8
portunity cost of a long term, new technology tree crop is high.
Hence, managerial and institutional deficiencies encourage cultivation of lower risk traditional crops that are subject to boom and bust
fluctuations. In this sense, reducing high opportunity costs for development forestry is a problem of managerial technology. Failure to
acknowledge this problem works against rural development objectives.
It is important for forestry that institutional capabilities be increased to lower opportunity costs, or conversely, raise the market
price of socially overvalued activities that detract from development
goals. Consensus is growing that the market price of development
forestry tends to understate the activity's social value. This is evident
in the persistent policy of opting for large scale pulp mills supplied
by large farmers, and ignoring the social costs of skewed land and income distribution perpetuated by this approach. The responsible forestry organization must be capable of multi-year planning and budgeting and employment opportunities. Political support at the top levels
of LDC governments should be encouraged by loans or technical
assistance to forestry agencies that assign adequate power and budget
authority to forestry responsibility centers. Forestry consists of diverse activities such as land acquisition, distribution of credit, extension services, and design of farmer organizations which typically cross
agency jurisdiction, to agriculture, land reform and rural development.
Care must be taken initially, therefore, to "crosswalk" agency responsibilities into functional cost centers for purposes of accountability. The continuing LDC spectacle of decentralized agencies wildly
competing for turf at the expense of larger policy coordination,
should be recognized as a threat to development forestry.
FINANCIAL POLICY OPTIONS
Organizational capabilities can be enhanced through budgeting and
financial management, and through an appropriate crosswalk of
agency jurisdiction to improve field level and top policy decisions by
the relevant forestry agency. Next the issue of financial policy must
be tackled. What is the most appropriate financial model to facilitate
decisionmaking in development forestry? It is suggested that an appropriate financial policy would include singularly, or in combina28. In Costa Rica, this persists less from any traditional small farmer mentality (as conventional wisdom would have it) than from the force of an elite-controlled development
agenda which reserves credit and resource support for the same class of large farmers on a
yearly basis. See Guess, Pasture Expansion, Forestry, and Development Contradictions:The
Case of Costa Rica, 14 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
42, 50 (Spring 1979).
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tion, (1) regulation, (2) subsidy and tax incentives, and (3) public
enterprise options. These options may be funded from local savings
and investments or through international loans. Given LDC economic
instability and political volatility, the public enterprise option should
be the dominant component of a technical-financial strategy for development forestry.
Regulation
The regulatory option is initially attractive since the public sector
may guide the market by setting timber concession rates, market
support prices, and land use controls to assure performance without
excessive negative externalities. If deforestation by private cattle
companies silts public irrigation projects, pollutes drinking water,
and eliminates needed topsoil for agricultural development, the public sector can impose costs to reduce this behavior.
Project analysts, however, select multi-objective alternative projects, such as energy, timber, and irrigation, through the use of net
present worth and cost-benefit analysis which presume the market
solution to be efficient. But "in developing countries particularly,
the optimizing qualities of the market mechanism cannot be relied
on. Markets are insufficiently developed and integrated to facilitate
the necessary adjustments without considerable price effects."'2
Where political preferences for self-promoting bureaucrats consistently overrule market preference, and monopolistic pricing patterns
mask real scarcities, use of such formal analytic techniques would
overestimate development benefits of projects geared toward short
run profit maximization, usually export items. Nelson also notes that
the "lack of a precise definition of development objectives that would
allow the use of weights' 30 restricts evaluation of tropical land development projects to estimating direct project impact in the region
of influence. By excluding benefits accruing beyond the region, traditional forestry is favored. On the other hand, analysts rarely shadow
price for social costs or local black markets when these factors can
affect the evaluation of a project proposal. Shanner3 1 notes the need
to shadow price where projects are to be evaluated from the national
economic point of view. Although techniques to compensate for bias
in financial analysis such as shadow pricing and sensitivity analysis
are themselves applied by planners within largely underdeveloped
bureaucratic structures, such techniques are "poor substitutes for a
29. D. WOLFSON, supra note 6, at 110.
30. M. NELSON, supra note 23, at 70.
31. See W. SHANER, PROJECT PLANNING FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 10552(1979).
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fiscal policy aimed at reducing market imperfections." 3 2 Given widespread market failure, the use of zero-based budgeting can counter
these limits in formal project analysis by placing the burden of analysis, and the weight of national support for development forestry, on
the public budgeting process. But high opportunity costs of capital
charges reflected in assignment of high discount rates are still levied
against development forestry projects by traditional analysts. Here,
both evaluation technique and decisionmaker preferences work
against adopting development forestry policy. This compounds the
regulatory problem in that approved projects directly and indirectly
use resources required for development forestry. That is, they absorb
available budgetary resources and deplete forests, soil, and water resources in the production of traditional crops or commodities.
Approval of traditional forestry projects tends to benefit wealthier
LDC social groups. Given the real tendency of LDC elites and dominant classes to impose political preferences rather than accept consumer signals according to the consumer preference model, 3 3 regulation requires coordination of an independent set of preferences by
institutions that can account for both multiple project objectives,
and multiple allegiances of private and public groups. This problem
undermines efforts, for example, to regulate large Central American
farmer deforestation of pasture to take advantage of high world beef
prices. Such farmers are also national leaders and control the decisionmaking of leading regulatory institutions.
Aside from the policy considerations of regulating private behavior
in the politically volatile LDC context, regulations must be tied to
specific activities. For example, if the government requires farmers to
(1) hire labor where capital intensive technologies might be cheaper
(harvesting timber by machine, mechanized furniture manufacturing),
(2) encourage land use practices that assure adequate local supplies
of food and wood, or (3) use only selected harvesting practices (evenage or sustained yield to preserve watershed and soil nutrient levels),
such policies can increase costs to the regulatee and transaction costs
to the regulator. This assumes both that regulator preferences are of
higher moral value and that the regulator can comprehend complex
internal technologies employed by the regulatee. These latter assumptions are unrealistic to the understaffed, overpoliticized LDC regulator.
Legal regulations that provide forestry incentives often penalize
unintentionally the very forest practices desired. The 1978 Costa
Rican Reforestation Law (Ley De Reforestacion), for example, per32. D. WOLFSON, supra note 6, at 114.
33. Id. at 15.
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mits the forest proprietor to deduct costs of reforestation from his
taxable income. 3 4 It also obliges the national banking system (Sistema Bancario Nacional) to finance treefarming, nurseries, and forestry on areas larger than one hectare. I I However, since most landholders are organized as sociedadanonima(S.A.), a company becomes
the de facto landowner. It can be argued that the company shareholder is discouraged from forestry investment since the exemption
would not apply to him. Whether or not the law encourages investment behavior is a matter of empirical investigation. Countries with
such laws should attempt to measure their impact on reforestation
activity. In short, regulation is superficially attractive but difficult to
implement.
Taxation-Subsidy
The second financial option is taxation-subsidy. LDC constraints
on rural taxation efforts are well-known: (1) administrative, such as
poorly conceived tax structures, and inability to uncover devious accounting practices of large foreign corporations; (2) sociopolitical,
such as privileged immunity for the local kleptocracy in relation to
poorer classes; and (3) economic, such as low tax ratios for the elite
who oppose taxation of their wealth.' 6 Nevertheless, the tax system
can be designed to (1) improve the rate of capital formation; (2) provide non-inflationary financing for a supply of cooperating factors,
such as (public health, transport, and education, on which development policies largely depend); and, (3) upgrade performance in the
private and public sectors by "making the structure of relative prices
more consistent with optimal welfare as the policy-makers see it."' I
For LDCs, the sociopolitical constraint weighs heaviest on a
rational taxation or subsidy scheme. The Ludwig "Jari Project" in
Brazil is exemplary. The Brazilian government provides substantial
loan guarantees and import duty exemptions to the Ludwig corporation which amounts to large tax expenditures. Ludwig's 250,000
acres of trees require a $300,000 investment per day to cover costs
of felling native forest, planting pulp trees, and providing for the
30,000 people who benefit from the operation. 3 8 In return for the
obvious local benefits of pulp production from fast-growing Caribbean
Pine and Melina plantations, high levels of worker income in the
34. Ley De Reforestacion, 1978, No. 6184.
35. OFIPLAN, supra note 13, at 43.
36. D. WOLFSON, supra note 13, at 43.
37. Id. at 162.
38. McIntyre, Jari:
A Massive Technology Transplant Takes Root in the Amazon Jungle,
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, May 1980, at 694.
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underdeveloped northeast region, and net returns to soil ecology,
oxygen level, and tropical forest technology, the real opportunity
costs in taxation or subsidy to Brazil are largely unknown. Opponents
charge imperialist exploitation and demand both an end to the current subsidy and nationalization of the entire project. Nevertheless, it
would seem that such a highly sophisticated project could be taxed
equitably in proportion to accumulating profits, and that subsidies,
justifiable here in a strict sense only, where price supports exceed the
equivalent world market price for pulp, could be gradually eliminated.
But just as social costs should be measured and included in forestry
project evaluation, social benefits to the northeast region, beyond
narrow and often misleading profit returns to Ludwig, should be
(and still are) considered in the tax policy calculus. As in most forest
projects, the final tax package must account for world demand for
pulp or other forest products, the pre-existing local ecological balance, and the local political situation or the sociopolitical constraint
on taxation. Despite income and employment opportunities, the project is traditional forestry since justification was based on maximizing
investor returns and cost recovery potential. Development considerations always have been of secondary importance to these entrepreneurs.
Public EnterpriseOptions
Given the complexities of designing appropriate regulation and
subsidy structures, the LDC interested in development forestry should
consider public influence in the ownership or control of enterprise. If
for no other reason, the constraints of tax evasion and regulatory
end-runs are administratively internalized. The notion of public
enterprise implies both public funding and decisive public control
over managerial policies. Given the narrow uses of net present worth
(NPW) and discounting techniques by project analysts, who tend to
stress the market perspective, development forestry projects are especially ripe for the public enterprise option. This conclusion generally
follows from innovative efforts to calculate NPW from the national
economic point of view, and the use of relevant shadow prices for
sales plus other social benefits in land productivity, employment, and
income distribution.3" Direct public investment in and regulation of
the entire Jari Project might have tied its benefits to Brazilian national
development. Instead, Ludwig must maximize cost recovery for risks
taken that could have been returned to the local treasury for possible
public investments in development programs. The profitability of the
39. W. SHANER, supra note 31, at 126-52.
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Jari Project, of course, implies success for future private entrepreneurs. This should be the signal for public enterprise to follow suit.
Adoption of the public enterprise option would also simplify the
budgetary reform and functional crosswalk problems noted earlier.
It implies, according to Nelson, problems in "bureaucratic administrative procedures: the scarcity of capital and of management and
technical personnel and the absence of a marketing organization for
exports."' I Nevertheless, variations in budgetary and organizational
reform strategies depend upon the development environment within
which forestry investment occurs. The World Bank distinguishes six
major types of environments. In suggesting combinations of public
enterprise policies, it may be useful to include some regulation and
taxation-subsidy instruments for improved development performance.
First, "wood-efficient marginal lands" consists of those areas where
shifting agriculture, nomadic grazing, and eroding soils contribute to
a hostile environment for forest ecology.4 1 These are the Type I areas
where animal fodder and dung, instead of timber,' 2 are used for energy. Forestry investment would concentrate here on afforestation to
support production of firewood and fodder. Hence, institutional
efforts should stress improved forest ecology rather than economic
forestry for cash flow returns. The Sahelian zone countries provide
examples of this type. Subsidies should be provided to farmers, companies, or landless farmers to resettle themselves and their animals
while restocking the area with timber. A useful tactic may be public
construction of agricultural villages and resettlement to lands with
improved productivity. Given the paucity of domestic savings, the
likely funding source would be an international loan.
Type II is the "potential afforestation area" which has both better
climatic-ecological conditions and lower population density than the
Type I area. Given the incredible growth potential of tropical forests20 to 30 cubic meters per hectare of wood growth per annum (or
greater for leguminous species such as Leucaena or Albizia) as opposed to an average of three to five cubic meters in interior Canada
and five to eight cubic meters in the U.S. Pacific Northwest coastal
regions4 3_the possibility of establishing forest plantations, either individually owned tree farms or cooperatively owned, jointly managed
activities, is extremely high. Performance budgeting which requires
reporting activity schedules and evaluating yearly cubic meter growth
together with measures of change in social indicators should be
40.
41.
42.
43.

M. NELSON, supra note 23, at 48.
The World Bank, Forestry Sector Policy Paper 32 (February 1978).
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Id. at 44.
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adopted. Such budgeting systems can provide multi-year planning,
costing, and outlay capabilities to the forestry agency whose activities
should then be crosswalked to agencies which provide cooperating
factors such as education, health care, and extension services for
project residents.
Where population pressures are greater in the third type of "overpopulated wood-deficient areas," excessive cutting of upland wood
resources results in loss of catchment cover, soil erosion, and adverse
hydrological
effects, such as flood peaks and low stream flows (Type
Ill). 4 4 The sociopolitical constraint will be greater here (India, Bangladesh, Java) in that poor farmers and landless peasants will demand
timber in opposition to the rational strategy. Hence, a wider functional crosswalk may be required and cost-sharing among public agencies to control destructive intervening factors in the development forestry strategy.
In the fourth type of environment, "wood abundant poor areas,"
where vast tracts of natural forest remain, population pressure is low
and expatriate companies often mine the timber for export in traditional forestry fashion. Given the light tropical soil, fertility for other
agricultural uses is low. The Congo Basin and New Guinea are examples of such areas. This environment provides a good opportunity
for either effective regulation or subsidy tactics. A public enterprise
mechanism can be used to resettle the population from Type I environments to large forest colonies that contain the full range of cooperating factors. Costa Rican-styled tax incentives to grow trees
probably would not function in areas where taxable income is zero;
however, as noted, the feasibility of the public enterprise strategy
may be justifiable ex post facto by the success of the private Jari
Project in the poorer northeast Brazilian region. Where wood abundant areas exist with severe population pressures (Type V), 4 I the
need for larger public supported forestry colonies becomes even
greater. Here the best elements of an ecological strategy contain soil,
oxygen, microclimate, and water. Economic development and consideration for education, income, and employment can be combined
and founded on both primary and secondary forestry occupations.
Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast provide examples of this environmental type.
The Type VI environmental area is "wood abundant and rich."
Here research and experimentation with both institutional types and
species growth rates under tropical and desert conditions should be
44. The World Bank, Forestry Sector Policy Paper 32 (February 1978).
45. Id. at 33.
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intensified. Technology developed in the United States, the Soviet
Union, and Scandinavia can be employed by both private international forestry corporations and by LDC governments that fall into
environmental types I-VI. The U.S. Forest Service contains the budgetary technology, institutional flexibility, and managerial talent to
lead the way in this area. Institutions such as the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank,
and the World Bank feasibly could participate with the Forest Service
in joint or multilateral financed forestry projects.
CONCLUSION
The ecological and economic benefits of forestry suggest that LDC
policies should focus on designing and implementing development
forestry projects. While some technical issues remain, obstacles to
moving beyond narrow industrial forestry to agriforestry programs,
with development benefits in land productivity, employment, and income distribution are primarily issues of political preference and administrative structure. It is critical that LDCs develop techniques to
strengthen institutional capabilities which encourage farmers to engage in forestry, and to distinguish conditions under which an appropriate financial strategy of subsidy, regulation, or public enterprise
might apply. Given the complexity of both the ecological and political environment, LDCs should examine the potential benefits of public enterprise funding and control.
Five years ago, development forestry was considered financially
unrealistic. Today, international lending institutions and LDC governments seem willing to overspend on forestry projects with development as the stated purpose. The bandwagon effect continues. To
counter this trend, efforts should be made either prior to such outlays, or simultaneously with project scheduling, to improve budgetary
and financial management systems. Finally, efforts should be made
to improve institutional coordination through more logical functional
crosswalks. Without prior institutional considerations, benefits of development forestry programs may be overrun by the conflicting imperatives of a policy jungle.

